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I.

ADMIRALTY & MARITIME LAW

The Rescue Doctrine in Maritime Law after Furka v. Great
Lakes Dredge and Dock Co.
"Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. . .The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it
is a wrong also to his rescuer."'
The law encourages courageous responses to life threatening situations.2 The law also recognizes that the human impulse to rescue others
in peril may cause a rescuer to engage in behavior that normally would
be unduly dangerous.' Ordinarily, a tortfeasor's allegation that a plaintiff
contributed to his injuries by virtue of the plaintiff's own negligence is
an affirmative defense to the plaintiff's claim of negligence. 4 The rescue
1. Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 437 (1921)(Cardozo, J.)
(introducing principle of rescue doctrine).
2. See Berg v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 759 F.2d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that
maritime rescue doctrine encourages rescue attempts); Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv. Inc.,
412 F.2d 1011, 1021 (5th Cir. 1969) (same); Maryland Steel Co. v. Marney, 88 Md. 482,
-,
42 A. 60, 66 (1898) (noting that law encourages rescues and will not impute negligence
to rescuer unless rescuer acts rashly); Corbin v. City of Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461, 468-69, 45
A. 1070, 1074 (1900) (same).
3. See Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921) (noting
that law will not impute negligence to rescuer). Courts have held that errors of judgment will
not count against a rescuer if the errors result from the excitement and confusion of the
moment. Id. (citing Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461, 472, 45 A. 1070, 1073-74 (1900));
see Trott v. Dean Witter & Co., 438 F. Supp. 842, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting that rescue
doctrine exists for benefit of persons instinctively reacting to danger), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1370
, 42 A. 60, 66 (1898) (noting
(2d Cir. 1978); Maryland Steel Co. v. Marney, 88 Md. 48,
that rescuer's negligence will not defeat recovery by rescuer).
4. See generally Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 65, at 451-62 (W. Keeton 5th
ed. 1984)[hereinafter PROSSER & KETON] (discussing contributory negligence). In some states
contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery. Id. at 461. A plaintiff is contributorily
negligent when he fails to exercise the degree of care for his own safety that a reasonable or
prudent man would have exercised in the same circumstances. Id. at 453; see Shanklin v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 254 F. Supp. 223, 233 (S.D. W. Va. 1966) (defining contributory negligence
as failure of plaintiff to exercise care for own safety), aff'd 383 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1967).
An affirmative defense to negligence that is similar to contributory negligence is the
doctrine of assumption of the risk. See generally PROSsER & KEETON, supra, § 68, at 480-98
(discussing doctrine of assumption of risk). Under the doctrine of assumption of the risk, a
plaintiff cannot recover damages from the defendant if the plaintiff voluntarily submitted
himself to a known danger. Id.; see Arndt v. Russillo, 231 Va. 328, 332, 343 S.E.2d 84, 87
(1986) (defining assumption of risk).
Courts distinguish between the doctrines of assumption of the risk and contributory
negligence. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 68, at 481. In an assumption of the risk case,
the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily enters a dangerous situation. Id. In assumption of the
risk situations, therefore, the courts have concluded that the defendant owed no duty of care
to the plaintiff. Id. Because the defendant owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, the defendant
could not have acted negligently toward the plaintiff. Id. In contributory negligence cases,
however, both the defendant and the plaintiff are negligent. Id. § 65, at 452; see Va. Elec. &
Power Co. v. Winesett, 225 Va. 459, 470, 303 S.E.2d 868, 875 (1983) (distinguishing between
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doctrine, however, can operate as an exception to the rule of contributory

negligence when a person responds to a "cry of distress" that the negligence of a tortfeasor made necessary.' When a rescuer invokes the rescue
doctrine, the rescuer may recover damages from the tortfeasor for any
injuries that the rescuer sustained during his rescue attempt, despite proof
that the rescuer acted negligently in his rescue attempt. 6 Thus, the rescue
doctrine has developed as a complete defense to an allegation that the
7
rescuer was contributorily negligent.

doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence).
Many states have reduced the severity of the contributory negligence rule by adopting a
comparative negligence standard. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 67, at 471-79 (discussing
comparative negligence). Under the simplest version of the comparative negligence doctrine,
the trier of fact determines the degree to which the defendant and the plaintiff each were
negligent and then apportions damages accordingly. Id. at 471-73. For instance, if a jury
determines that a plaintiff was 35% responsible for his own injuries, the jury will decrease
the plaintiff's final award by 35%. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 875, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (1975)(en banc)(adopting comparative negligence to
decrease plaintiff's award); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 434 (Fla. 1973) (same); Placek
v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 660-61, 275 N.W. 2d 511, 515 (1979) (same).
5. See, e.g., Stevens v. Baggett, 154 Ga. App. 317, 318, 268 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1980)
(generally discussing rescue doctrine); Henneman v. McCalla, 260 Iowa 60, -, 148 N.W.2d
447, 454 (1967) (same); Marks v. Wagner, 52 Ohio App. 2d 320, 323-24, 370 N.E.2d 480, 483
(1977) (same). See generally 1 J. DooLEY, MODERaN TORT LAw, § 3.08.50, at 28-30 (1982 &
Supp. 1987)[hereinafter J. DooLEY](discussing rescue doctrine, which provides that a person
who attempts to rescue another person who is in imminent peril is not contributorily negligent
as matter of law); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 44, at 307-08 (same); 57 AM. Jui. 2D
Negligence §§ 227, 418 (1971)(same); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 124 (1966 & Supp. 1987)(same).
6. See Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921) (describing
rescue doctrine as bar to defense of contributory negligence); Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa.
461, 469-70, 45 A. 1070, 1074 (1900) (discussing application of rescue doctrine to avoid
contributory negligence as bar to recovery).
The rescue doctrine provides for a rescuer's recovery of damages from whoever is
responsible for the perilous situation, be it a third party tortfeasor or the imperiled party
himself. See Provenzo v. Sam, 23 N.Y.2d 256, 260, 296 N.Y.S.2d 322, 325, 244 N.E.2d 26,
28 (1968) (allowing rescuer to recover from rescued party who was solely responsible for peril).
Additionally, most courts have extended the rescue doctrine to allow for recovery by plaintiffs
injured during attempts to rescue property and persons from danger. See Rovinski v. Rowe,
131 F.2d 687, 692 (6th Cir. 1942)(same); George A. Fuller Constr. Co. v. Elliot; 92 Ga. App.
309, 317, 88 S.E.2d 413, 419 (1955) (applying rescue doctrine to rescuers of property). See
generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 44, at 308-09 (discussing application of rescue
doctrine to individuals rescuing property as well as persons); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 125
(1966 & Supp. 1987)(applying rescue doctrine to rescuers of property).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 472 (1965) (delineating rescue exception to
contributory negligence doctrine).
The rescue doctrine is related to, but separate from, the affirmative duty to rescue an
imperiled party that courts impose on persons in some situations. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 4, § 56, at 373-85 (discussing affirmative duty to rescue). Based on the relationship
between the parties, as well as the circumstances of the peril, courts occasionally will impose
on an onlooker an affirmative duty to rescue an imperiled party. See Anderson v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 333 U.S. 821, 823 (1948) (imposing on employer duty to rescue employee);
Abbott v. United States Lines, Inc., 512 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1975) (imposing on ship's
crew duty to save seaman who fell overboard). The rescue doctrine is also related to the
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The theoretical basis of the rescue doctrine is the presumption that
the negligence of a tortfeasor foreseeably would have invited a rescue
attempt.8 Under the rescue doctrine, therefore, when a tortfeasor is negligent, a third party rescuer is a foreseeable plaintiff. 9 Accordingly, the
tortfeasor owes the rescuer a duty of care independent of the duty of care
that the tortfeasor owes to the imperiled party. 0 To invoke the rescue
doctrine, the rescuer must demonstrate that a person or property was in
imminent danger, or that the rescuer reasonably believed that a person or
property was in danger." Once the rescuer has perceived the emergency

"good samaritan" doctrine, which imposes liability on a rescuer for a negligent rescue that
increases the injuries of the rescued party. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 56, at 37385 (discussing liability of rescuer to rescued party for injury due to negligent rescue); 65 C.J.S.
Negligence § 63(107)(1966 & Supp. 1987)(same). Under the "good samaritan" doctrine, a court
will impose liability for injuries to the rescued party upon a rescuer who acts so wantonly
during the rescue-ohat he increases the injuries of the rescued party. See McDonough v.
Buckeye S.S. Co., 103 F. Supp. 473, 475-76 (N.D. Ohio 1951)(recognizing rescuer's liability
for injuries due to negligent rescue), aff'd, 200 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 926 (1953); Roberson v. U.S., 382 F.2d 714, 718-720 (9th Cir. 1967) (same).
8. See Bonney v. Canadian Nat'l Ry. Co., 613 F. Supp. 997, 1007 (D. Me. 1985)
(noting that tortfeasor is liable for injury to rescuer if intervening act of rescuer was
foreseeable); Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921) (discussing
theory that, even when tortfeasor did not foresee rescue attempt, tortfeasor is accountable to
rescuer as if he had foreseen attempt); 57 Am. JuR. 21 Negligence § 227 (1971)(stating that
defendant's negligence is proximate cause of rescuer's injury).
9. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that rescuer is foreseeable plaintiff);
see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 343-47, 162 N.E. 99, 100-101 (1928)
(holding that tortfeasor has duty to prevent injury to foreseeable plaintiffs).
10. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 44, at 307-08 (discussing rescuer as foreseeable
plaintiff); supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (same).
11. See, e.g., Lambert v. Parrish, 467 N.E.2d 791, 798-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (noting
that rescuer must have reasonable belief of need for rescue); Ellmaker v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 372 S.W.2d 650, 657 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (same); Marks v. Wagner, 52 Ohio
App. 2d 320, 324, 370 N.E.2d 480, 484 (1977) (same). See generally 5a L. FRTrMER AND M.
FUEDMAN, Personal Injury- Actions, Defenses, Damages, Rescuers § 1.03 (1987) (noting that
rescuer must have reasonable belief of need for rescue); Annotation, Liability for Death of,
or Injury to, One Seeking to Rescue Another, 158 A.L.R. 189 (1945) (same); 57 Am. Jog. 2D
Negligence § 420 (1971 & Supp. 1987) (same); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 124 (1966 & Supp.
1987) (same).
In Lambert v. Parrish the Indiana Court of Appeals listed several factors that the jury
might consider in determining whether the rescuer had a reasonable belief in the need for a
rescue. Lambert v. Parrish, 467 N.E.2d 791, 799 n. 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). The court noted
that factors relevant to the reasonableness of the rescuer's belief include the rescuer's source
of knowledge of the situation inviting rescue, the lapse of time between the creation of the
danger to the imperiled party and the rescuer's awareness of the situation, and the probability
that other people already have rescued the imperiled party. Id. To recover under the rescue
doctrine, a plaintiff must prove that a person or property was in imminent peril of severe
harm, either real or reasonably perceived, rather than merely in need of assistance. See FRUMER
"D FRErDmAN, supra, § 102(2) (noting requirement of peril for rescue doctrine); Annotation,
supra, at 193-94 (same); 57 AM. Ju. 2D Negligence § 418 (1971 & Supp. 1987) (same); 65A
C.J.S. Negligence § 124 (1966 & Supp. 1987) (same). Courts define "imminent peril" as a
situation that calls for immediate action. See, e.g., Connelly v. Redman Dev. Corp., 533 P.2d
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situation and begun to act, the rescuer must execute the rescue with the
care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances. 12 The rescue doctrine recognizes that actions which would be
negligent under normal circumstances may be reasonable in an emergency
situation. 3 Thus, the tortfeasor may not raise the defenses of contributory
negligence or assumption of the risk when the rescuer reasonably believed
that someone was in danger, and the rescuer acted in a reasonable manner
14
under the circumstances.
The rescue doctrine has frequent application in maritime law. 5 Seamen
commonly are exposed to severe danger in the normal course of business

53, 55 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (describing peril as requiring immediate action); Arnold v.
Northern States Power Co., 209 Minn. 551, , 297 N.W. 182, 187 (1941) (same); Wolfinger v.
Shaw, 138 Neb. 229, , 292 N.W. 731, 735 (1940) (same).
In at least one jurisdiction, a rescuer must show that a person or property actually was
in peril. See Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 232 Va. 502, 508, 352 S.E.2d 311,314 (1987) (holding
that rescue doctrine is not applicable to rescue of victims that the rescuer has not actually
perceived, but that the rescuer believes might exist). A reasonable belief that someone or
something might be in peril is insufficient to invoke the rescue doctrine in those jurisdictions.
Id.
12. See, e.g., Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that rescuer must act as reasonably prudent man would act); Stevens v. Baggett, 154 Ga.App.
317, 319, 268 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1980) (same); Wolff v. Light, 169 N.W.2d 93, 99 (N.D. 1969)
(same); French v. Chase, 48 Wash. 2d 825, __
, 297 P.2d 235, 237 (1956) (same); Wagner
v. Int'l Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921) (same).
Some courts express the standard to apply to a rescuer's conduct as a wanton or reckless
standard. See Coulton v. Caruso, 195 So. 804, 806 (La. Ct. App. 1940) (noting that courts
frequently express conduct of prudent man under similar circumstances as conduct that is not
rash or reckless); Bell Cab Co. v. Vasquez, 434 S.W.2d 714, 718-19 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968)
(noting that, if jury realizes that it must judge conduct in light of surrounding circumstances,
whether judge states jury instruction in terms of reasonable man under circumstances or rash
and reckless is unimportant). Technically, however, courts properly should state the standard
for judging the negligence of a rescuer's conduct as the reasonable or prudent man under the
same circumstances standard, rather than a rash or reckless standard. See Henjum v. Bok,
261 Minn. 74, __
, 110 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1961) (noting that application of rescue doctrine
does not change standard of care by which trier of fact will judge person's actions); infra
notes 59-106 and accompanying text (noting that reasonable man is proper standard for rescue
doctrine).
13. See Grand Trunk R.R. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 417 (1892) (noting that proper conduct
which will protect individual from liability depends on circumstances). In Coulton v. Caruso
the Louisiana Court of Appeals listed the factors that a jury should consider to determine
whether a rescuer acted reasonably. Coulton v. Caruso, 195 So. 804, 806 (La. Ct. App. 1940).
The Coulton court stated that, in judging whether a rescuer acted as a reasonable man would
have acted, juries should consider the existence of an emergency, the excitement and confusion
of the situation, the uncertainty of the rescuer about the best means of executing the rescue,
and the necessity for immediate action. Id.; see 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 124 (1966 & Supp.
1987)(discussing reasonableness test of rescue doctrine).
14. See supra notes 2-13 and accompanying text (describing rescue exception to doctrine
of contributory negligence).
15. See The Clarita, 90 U.S. (23 Wall) 1, 16 (1874) (noting that traditions of seamen
demand that law honor rescue attempts); Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv. Inc., 412 F.2d 1011,
1021 (5th Cir.), cert.denied 396 U.S. 1033 (1969) (noting that admiralty law must encourage
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and often must rely on themselves for rescue. 16 In response to the frequent
dangers of maritime employment, the policy of the courts is to encourage
daring rescue attempts at sea. 17 In considering application of the rescue
doctrine, most courts previously have not distinguished between the operation of the rescue doctrine on land and at sea."8 In Furka v. Great
Lakes Dredge and Dock Company,' 9 (FurkaI) however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the threshold

requirement of the rescue doctrine, that the rescuer be reasonable in
perceiving the need for a rescue, should be applicable to admiralty rescues. 20

On January 9, 1982, a storm and turbulent seas raged in the Chesapeake Bay near Baltimore. 2 ' The plaintiff's decedent, her husband, was
chief-of-party of a surveying team on a Boston Whaler of the Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Company.?2 A tugboat with a scow attached lost its rudder
and its power and went adrift in the bay.? The captain of the tug radioed

rescue impulses of seamen); Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1089
(4th Cir. 1985) (same). See generally 3A M. NoapIs, BENEDICT ON ADaLm~A. §§ 233-34 (7th
ed. 1987) (noting tradition of rescue and salvage at sea). In admiralty, the liberal policy of
monetary awards for salvage of property and persons represents the desire of the admiralty
courts to encourage seamen to aid persons and property in distress. Id.
16. See M. Nous, supra note 15, §§ 233-34 (discussing dangerousness of life at sea).
17. See id. (discussing policies and traditions of rescue and salvage at sea).
18. See Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866, 869 (4th Cir. 1931) (applying common
law negligence standard to maritime rescue attempt). But see Berg v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
759 F.2d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that although courts judging early maritime rescue
cases applied traditional reasonable man negligence standard to rescues at sea, more recent
cases have rejected reasonableness standard in favor of wanton or reckless standard). In Berg
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited Grigsby v. Coastal Marine
Service of Texas, Inc. in support of its conclusion that a wanton or reckless standard was
correct for application of the rescue doctrine at sea. Berg, 759 F.2d at 1429 (citing Grigsby v.
Coastal Marine Serv. Inc., 412 F.2d 1011, 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1033 (1969)).
In Grigsby, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not use a
wanton or reckless standard in applying the rescue doctrine, but rather used a wanton or
reckless standard in applying the good samaritan doctrine. Grigsby, 412 F.2d at 1021. Although
the two doctrines are similar, the good samaritan doctrine and the rescue doctrine are not the
same. See supra note 7 (distinguishing good samaritan doctrine from rescue doctrine). There-

fore, the Ninth Circuit in Berg was incorrect in its conclusion that courts apply the rescue
doctrine at sea using a wanton or reckless standard. Berg, 759 F.2d at 1429. See supra notes
11-12 and accompanying text (noting that correct standard of care for rescue doctrine is
reasonable man standard).
19. 824 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1987) (Furka II).
20. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company, 824 F.2d 330, 331-32 (4th Cir.
1987)(Furka II).
21. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1985)
(Furka1).
22. Id. The Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company was participating in a dike
construction project in the area, and had numerous tugboats, scows and Boston Whalers in
the bay. Id.
23. Id. In Furka I, the defendant, Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company, owned all
the boats involved in the accident. Id.
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for assistance. 24 The decedent responded to the call for assistance by taking
a Boston Whaler into the bay and attempting to remove the scowman
from the scow.Y The scowman refused to leave the scow, so the decedent
turned back toward shore.2 6 On the way back to shore, the Boston Whaler
27
began to take on water and ultimately the decedent drowned.
The wife of the decedent brought an action against Great Lakes Dredge
and Dock Company in the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland under the Jones Act for negligence and under general maritime law for unseaworthiness. 2 At trial the judge gave the jury an
instruction on contributory negligence, but the judge did not instruct the
jury on the rescue doctrine. 29 The jury awarded a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, but also determined that the plaintiff's decedent had been sixtyfive percent comparatively negligent and, therefore, offset the plaintiff's
award by sixty-five percent.3 0 The plaintiff appealed the verdict to the
24. Id.

25. Id. In Furka I the decedent chose to take a small Boston Whaler into the storm
because no larger boats were available. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.

28. Id. The Jones Act governs personal injury cases in admiralty. 46 U.S.C. § 688(a)
(1982 & Supp.III 1985). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Jones Act to
incorporate the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). 45 U.S.C. §§ 5160 (1982). See Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 209 (1955) (interpreting the Jones Act to include
the provisions of FELA). Thus, the Jones Act operates as a type of workmen's compensation
provision for seamen. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMnIALTy § 620 to -27, 325-54 (2d ed. 1975) (discussing personal injury actions at admiralty). To recover
under the Jones Act, a plaintiff must be a "seaman" who sustains injury "in the course of
his employment". 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982 & Supp.III 1985). A "seaman" is a person
employed upon a floating structure that is a vessel. See GrLMoRE & BLACK, supra, § 6-21 at
328-34 (defining "seaman" in context of Jones Act). The Jones Act provision that a seaman
sustain the injury "in the course of his employment," requires that the seaman be answerable
to the call of duty at the time of his injury. Id.
The captain's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel to his employees is the basis for the
unseaworthiness cause of action. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 497-98
(1971). The duty that the seaworthiness doctrine requires of a captain is absolute. Seas Shipping
v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946); see generally GIlMoRE & BLACK, supra, § 6-38 to -44, at
383-404. The doctrine does not base the duty on the knowledge of the captain or his crew.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra, § 6-41 at 392-93. Courts have expanded considerably the unseaworthiness cause of action so that the cause of action now is practically indistinguishable from
a cause of action under the Jones Act. Id. The common practice in framing a claim in
admiralty is to name both unseaworthiness and Jones Act causes of action in the complaint.
Id., § 6-23 to -25 at 342-51. The major advantage of stating two causes of action is that the
Jones Act secures the right to a jury trial for the plaintiff, while the unseaworthiness claim
permits an award of both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses to the plaintiff. Id. The Jones
Act limits awards to pecuniary losses. Id.
29. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1088 & n. 5(4th Cir.
1985) (Furka 1).

30. Id. at 1088. Contributory negligence does not completely bar recovery at admiralty.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939). Courts apply comparative
negligence, however, to mitigate damages that the plaintiff's negligence caused. Johannessen
v. Gulf Trading & Transp. Co., 633 F.2d 653, 655 (2d Cir. 1980); see supra note 4 and
accompanying text (discussing contributory and comparative negligence).
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3
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. '
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial judge erroneously refused
to instruct the jury on the rescue doctrine.3 2 In considering the plaintiff's
argument, the Fourth Circuit noted that the plaintiff had based her case
on the premise of a rescue situation. 33 The Fourth Circuit also noted that,
without the rescue instruction, the members of the jury may not have
known that they could not assess comparative fault if they found that the
plaintiff had been engaged in a bona fide rescue attempt at the time of
his injury.3 4 The Fourth Circuit held, therefore, that the trial judge's
3
refusal to instruct the jury on the rescue doctrine was plain error.
The Fourth Circuit also addressed the issue of the proper content of
a rescue instruction for a maritime rescue.3 6 The court first acknowledged
that a comparative, rather than contributory, negligence standard operates
in admiralty. 37 The court also acknowledged that, on land, courts which
use a comparative negligence* theory usually apply a reasonable man
standard to the rescuer's conduct in rescue doctrine cases.38 On the other
hand, the Fourth Circuit noted that courts that recognize contributory
negligence as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery often require proof
that the defendant acted wantonly or recklessly in the execution of his
rescue attempt. 39 The Fourth Circuit explained that the more liberal wanton
or reckless standard had developed in contributory negligence jurisdictions
largely to counteract the harsh results of the doctrine of contributory

31. Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088.
32. Id. In Furka 1, in addition to appealing the district court judge's refusal to give a
rescue instruction to the jury, the plaintiff cited several other errors in the rulings of the lower
court judge. Id. at 1088-90. The plaintiff argued that the absence of an instruction on the
unseaworthiness of the scow and the disabled tug was error. Id. at 1090. The plaintiff also
claimed that the court's instructions to the jury on contributory negligence essentially were
assumption of the risk instructions. Id. The plaintiff argued, therefore, that the court committed
reversible error because assumption of the risk is not a recognized defense in admiralty. Id.;
see supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing nonrecognition of contributory negligence
defense at admiralty). The plaintiff also argued that the instruction which the trial judge gave
to the jury on the unseaworthiness of the Boston Whaler was unduly confusing and misleading.
FurkaI, 755 F.2d at 1090-91. Finally, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in directing
a verdict for the defendant on the issue of punitive damages under the Jones Act claim. Id.
at 1091.
33. Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088.
34. Id.; see supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (noting that rescue doctrine bars
defense of comparative negligence).
35. Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1089..Because the trial judge's refusal to give the jury a rescue
instruction in Furka I was a misstatement of law, the plaintiff's failure to object to the absent
instruction was not a waiver of the defect. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1088-89; see supra note 30 (noting that contributory negligence is not a defense
in admiralty); GMoRE & BLACK, supra note 28, § 6-26, at 351-52 (same).
38. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755. F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (4th Cir.
1985)(Furka 1).
39. Id. at 1088.
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negligence. 40 The Fourth Circuit decided, however, that even though con-

tributory negligence does not exist as a bar to recovery in admiralty, the
wanton or reckless standard was appropriate to apply to the rescuer's

conduct in admiralty rescue cases. 41 The court felt that the more liberal
wanton or reckless standard would further the courts' policy of encour-

aging daring rescues at sea. 42 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that
the proper standard for the jury to use in assessing the conduct of the

plaintiff's decedent during the rescue attempt was a wanton or reckless
standard. 43 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the trial judge's refusal to
give the jury the appropriate rescue instruction was plain error that
44
required a new trial and, thus, remanded the case to the district court.

On remand, the parties agreed to a special verdict form that presented

the jury with a two-part test concerning the rescue doctrine.4 5 The special
verdict form directed the jury to determine whether the decedent had
perceived the need for a rescue attempt, and whether a reasonably prudent

person under the same circumstances would have perceived the need for
a rescue. 4 The jury determined that the decedent had been unreasonable

40. Id. Contributory negligence operates as a complete bar to recovery by a plaintiff,
while comparative negligence only decreases the amount of a plaintiff's recovery. See supra
note 4 (discussing difference between contributory negligence and comparative negligence).
41. Id. at 1089.
42. Id.; see supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (noting tradition of encouraging
rescues at sea).
43. Furka 1, 755 F.2d at 1089. In Furka I the Fourth Circuit addressed only the proper
negligence standard to apply to a rescuer's conduct during a rescue. Id. at 1088. The court
did not address the proper negligence standard to apply to the perception component of the
rescue doctrine. Id.
44. Id. The appellate court in Furka I ruled that excluding an instruction on the rescue
doctrine was error and, therefore, granted the plaintiff a new trial even though the plaintiff
had failed to object to the contributory negligence charge when the judge gave it. Id. at 1090.
Additionally, the court held that the omission of an instruction on the seaworthiness of the
tug and scow was not plain error. Id. Because the omission of an instruction on the rescue
doctrine warranted a new trial, however, the appellate court held that the trial judge should
include a seaworthiness instruction on the tug and scow at the second trial. Id. The court also
held that the instruction on contributory negligence was sufficiently clear and understandable.
Id. The appellate court recommended, however, that the trial judge at the second trial be
careful when instructing the jury to distinguish between the concepts of contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk. Id. at 1091. The court additionally ruled that the instruction on
the seaworthiness of the Boston Whaler was sufficiently clear and understandable. Id. Finally,
the court held that the question of punitive damages under the Jones Act was irrelevant
because no evidence existed to indicate that the defendant had been negligent to the extreme
extent necessary to warrant an award of punitive damages. Id.. See supra note 32 and
accompanying text (enumerating plaintiff's arguments on appeal in Furka 1).
45. See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1987)
(Furka 11) (describing two-part rescue instruction in second Furka district court trial). Id. In
the second Furka district court trial, the parties had stipulated to the negligence of the
defendants and the damage amounts that the first district court jury had assessed. Id. The
only issue remaining for the jury to consider was whether a rescue situation had existed. Id.
46. Id. At the second Furka trial, the judge explained to the jury that if the decedent
reasonably had perceived the need for a rescue, the jury must award the plaintiff the full
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in perceiving the need for a rescue and, thus, had been comparatively
negligent. 47 The plaintiff appealed.the second verdict to the Fourth Circuit
4
Court of Appeals. 1
On appeal the plaintiff argued that after Furka I, the proper test for
application of the rescue doctrine at sea was whether the decedent had
been wanton or reckless in his perception of the need for a rescue, rather
than whether the decedent had been reasonable in his perception of the
need for a rescue. 49 The Fourth Circuit in Furka I had not addressed the
issue of the proper standard of care for the jury to apply in judging the
rescuer's perception of the need for a rescue, but rather had addressed
the proper standard of care for the jury to apply to the rescuer's conduct
during the rescue.50 The Furka II court stated that in cases involving land
rescues, the rescue doctrine operates with a bifurcated standard of care,
consisting of a reasonable man standard for the perception component of
the doctrine and a wanton or reckless standard for the action component. 1
The court explained that although a bifurcated standard of care may be
proper in land rescues, maritime rescues present different considerations
to the court.5 2 The court noted that perception and action are inseparable
in maritime rescue situations, and thus the court should apply the same
standard of care to both elements of the rescue doctrine at sea.53 The
Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the rescue doctrine at sea should
apply to both
contain only one standard of care, which the jury should
4
the perception and action components of the doctrine..
In considering whether the single standard for admiralty rescues should
be a reasonableness standard or a recklessness standard, the Furka II
court explained that the Furka I court had chosen to apply the wanton
and reckless standard to the rescuer's conduct because of the unique
dangers inherent in the seaman's profession.55 The Furka II court reasoned
amount of damages without offset for any percentage of comparative negligence. Id. The
judge further explained that, if the jury found that the decedent unreasonably had perceived
the need for a rescue, the defendant would have established a successful claim of comparative
negligence, and the award of damages of the original district court jury would be correct. Id.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that parties had stipulated to damages awards
of trial jury).
47. Furka II, 824 F.2d 330, 331. On remand after the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Furka
I, the jury found that the plaintiff was unreasonable in his belief in the need for a rescue,
and therefore that the plaintiff was comparatively negligent. Id. Accordingly, the court reestablished the award of damages by the district court in the first trial. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 755 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (4th Cir.
1985)(Furka ])(addressing proper standard of care to apply to rescuer's conduct during rescue,

but not addressing proper standard of care to apply to rescuer's perception of need for rescue).
51. Furka II, 824 F.2d at 331.
52. Id. at 332.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 332; see Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1089 (noting that proper standard of care to
apply to rescuer's conduct is wanton or reckless standard).
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that the same considerations about the dangerousness of life at sea which
convinced the Furka I court to choose a recklessness standard for conduct
also warrant a recklessness standard for perception.16 Therefore, the court

in Furka 11 held that the single standard which a jury uses to judge both
perception and conduct in sea rescues should be a wanton or reckless

standard, rather than a reasonableness standard. 57 Because the district

court's instructions had failed to reflect the proper wanton or reckless

perception standard, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the
district court and remanded the case to the district court for determination
58
of the rescue issue.
In Furka I1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

repeated the error of the court in Furka I by confusing and unnecessarily
complicating the proper standards for applying the rescue doctrine to

rescues at sea.59 In rescue situations, as in non-rescue situations, negligence
is behavior that is unreasonable under the circumstances. 60 Accordingly,

whether a person is rescuing another, or merely walking down the street,
the proper standard of care is always the care that a reasonably prudent

person under similar circumstances would exercise. 6' The reasonable man
standard is flexible because the standard requires different conduct de-

pending on the circumstances. 62 Some circumstances justify a reasonable
man in taking extreme risks, and other circumstances hold the reasonable
man to the highest degree of caution. 63 Therefore, the proper jury instruc-

56. Furka II, 824 F.2d at 332.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing view that reasonable man
standard is only correct standard of care).
60. See J. DOOLEY, supra note 5, §§ 3.06-.10, at 24-32 (observing that unreasonableness
of thought or action in given situation is basis for all tort liability).
61. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 32, at 173-93 (noting that standard of care
is that of reasonable man under same circumstances); J. DooLEY, supra note 5, §§ 3.06-.08,
at 24-30 (1982) (same); see also Massey v. Scripter, 401 Mich. 385, 390, 258 N.W.2d 44, 47
(1977) (holding that, although scholars often use language suggesting varying degrees of care,
standard of care which law requires of rescuer is always that of reasonable man); Knapp v.
Stanford, 392 So. 2d 196, 198 (Miss. 1980) (abolishing sudden emergency doctrine because
instructions are misleading and confusing to jury); Calvert v. Ourum, 40 Or. App. 511,
- 595 P.2d 1264, 1267 (1979) (holding that, under rescue doctrine, standard of care
remains same as standard of care in everyday situations); supra notes 11-12 and accompanying
text (discussing reasonableness under circumstances as proper standard of care for rescue
doctrine).
62. See Meredith v. Reed, 26 Ind. 334, 336 (1866) (noting that law only requires ordinary
care of people keeping horses, but that ordinary care means more care for people keeping
stallions than for people keeping mares); J. DooLEY, supra note 5, § 3.08.50, at 28-29 (noting
flexibility of reasonable man standard in every situation); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4,
§ 33, at 193-208 (applying reasonable man standard to differing situations).
63. See PROSSER & IETON, supra note 4, § 33, at 196, 203, 205 (describing varying
degrees of conduct that court requires under differing circumstances). Courts generally recognize
that in an emergency situation, the exigencies of the moment cause the reasonable man to
exercise less care in his actions than he ordinarily would exercise. See Elmore v. Des Moines

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

19881

tion for any situation, including rescue situations, is always a 4reasonable
man instruction, rather than a wanton or reckless instruction.
Several courts have recognized that the reasonable man standard is 6a5
flexible standard that is correct in both rescue and nonrescue situations.
For example, in Calvert v. Ourum66 the Oregon Court of Appeals considered whether the trial judge erred when he refused to give a special rescue
instruction to the jury because he decided that the usual "reasonable man"
negligence instruction was sufficient to apply to an emergency situation.6 7
In Calvert the defendant hit the plaintiff with the defendant's pickup
truck while driving by the scene of the plaintiff's recent automobile
accident.68 The defendant claimed that the plaintiff had been contributorily
negligent. 6 9 Because the plaintiff had been attempting a rescue when the
defendant hit him, the plaintiff requested that the judge instruct the jury
on the rescue doctrine.70 The trial judge, however, refused to give the
instruction to the jury, and the jury found that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 7 ' On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals noted that

City Ry. Co., 207 Iowa 862, -, 224 N.W. 28, 31 (1929) (noting that law does not require
thoughtful care from individuals in emergencies). The law will require an enhanced level of
care, however, when the risk of injury to self or others is great. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra

note 4, § 34, at 198, 208. For example, individuals handling dangerous instrumentalities must
exercise the highest degree of care. See Liber v. Flor, 160 Colo. 7, -, 415 P.2d 332, 338
(1966) (holding that law requires individuals handling dynamite to exercise highest degree of
care).
64. See Massey v. Scripter, 401 Mich. 385, 390, 258 N.W.2d 44, 47 (1977) (holding that,
although scholars may use language which suggests the existence of differing degrees of care,
judge must instruct jury to apply reasonable man under circumstances test).
65. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable man standard
as proper standard for juries to apply in judging perception and conduct of rescuers).
The sudden emergency doctrine is the rescue doctrine applied to the situation when the
plaintiff finds himself, rather than another, in a position of imminent peril. See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 4, § 33,. at 196 (describing sudden emergency doctrine). Because courts so
frequently misstate the sudden emergency doctrine in jury instructions, the model jury instruction statutes in Illinois, Florida, Kansas, and Missouri recommend that a court not give a
specific emergency instruction, but rather give to the jury only the traditional negligence
instruction on the "reasonable man" standard. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 33,
at 197. The Mississippi Supreme Court entirely abolished the emergency doctrine in 1980.
Knapp v. Stanford, 392 So. 2d 196, 198 (Miss. 1980). See generally Annotation, Sudden
Emergency Instructions, 80 A.L.R.2d 5 (1961) (discussing in detail problems associated with
use of sudden emergency instructions).
66. 40 Or. App. 511, 595 P.2d 1264 (1979).
67. Calvert v. Ourum, 40 Or. App. 511, -, 595 P.2d 1264, 1267 (1979).
68. Id. at

-.

595 P.2d at 1265.

595 P.2d at 1266.
69. Id. at
70. Id. at
595 P.2d at 1267.
71. Id. In Calvert v. Ourum the trial judge decided that the rescue instruction which the
plaintiff requested was misleading and did not accurately reflect the law. Id. The plaintiff's
requested instruction stated in part that
[i]n the situation in which a Plaintiff is acting under the pressure of circumstances
which impel him to attempt to save human life, he generally is not held to the same
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the requested instruction implied incorrectly that the jury should not hold
a rescuer to the same standard of care as a reasonable man.7 The appellate
court explained that the usual negligence instruction, which cited the
reasonable man standard, was appropriate for an emergency situation
because it instructed the jury to consider the circumstances. 73 The court
held that the reasonable man test was appropriate for the rescue situation,
74
and thus, a special rescue instruction was unnecessary.
The reasonable man test theoretically should be correct in every
situation, including rescue situations. 75 In the context of the rescue doctrine, however, some courts rephrase the reasonable man test as a wanton
or reckless test and other courts differentiate between the reasonable man
test and the wanton or reckless test. 76 The Fourth Circuit in Furka I and
Furka 1I distinguished the two standards and suggested that the wanton

standard of care for his own safety that he normally would be held to.
Id. at -,
595 P.2d at 1266. The judge felt that the instruction erroneously suggested to
the jury that a rescuer is held to a different standard of care, when the instruction should
have stressed that the standard of care was the same in a rescue situation even if the jury
might find that different conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at
-, 595
P.2d at 1267.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. In Calvert v. Ourum the Court of Appeals of Oregon cited an Oregon Supreme
Court opinion in which the supreme court had stated that a court's failure to give a jury an
emergency instruction rarely would be error because the reasonable man negligence instruction
that the court gives to the jury in every tort case covers all circumstances, including emergencies.
Id. (citing Evans v. Gen. Tel., 257 Or. 460, 467, 479 P.2d 747, 750 (1971)).
75. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable man test as
proper standard for rescue doctrine).
76. See Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that
proper standard of care for rescuer is whether rescuer's conduct was that of an ordinary
prudent person under the circumstances, but trial court's use of term "extraordinary negligence"
was not incorrect); Stevens v. Baggett, 154 Ga. App. 317, 318, 268 S.E.2d 370, 372-73 (1980)
(noting that threshold test for application of rescue doctrine is whether plalntiff's conduct was
reasonable under circumstances and not rash or reckless); see also Prior Aviation Serv. Inc.
v. State, 100 Misc. 2d 237, 240, 418 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1979) (noting that
standard in applying rescue doctrine is whether rescuer's conduct "was not rash or reckless
or wanton but, rather, reasonable" under the circumstances. Id.)
In French v. Chase the Supreme Court of Washington found negligible the distinction
between a jury's finding that the conduct of rescuer in an emergency was short of being rash
or reckless and a finding that the conduct was slightly more risky than that of a prudent man.
French v. Chase, 48 Wash. 2d 825,
-, 297 P.2d 235, 240 (1956). The French court noted
that courts should use the reasonably prudent man standard when submitting negligence or
contributory negligence instructions to the jury. Id.
Even in the most famous of the rescue cases, Wagner v. InternationalRailway Co., Justice
Cardozo used both wanton or reckless language and reasonable man language in describing
the rescue doctrine. Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921).
Initially, Justice Cardozo stated that "the risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of
the occasion." Id. Later in the opinion, in discussing the reasonableness of a rescuer's belief,
the Justice observed that "[t]he law cannot say of his belief that a reasonable man would
have been unable to share it." Id. Cf. supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (discussing
reasonable man standard of care as correct under all circumstances).
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77
or reckless standard is more liberal than the reasonable man standard.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that because under the liberal wanton or

reckless standard a rescuer recovers against a tortfeasor in a greater number
of cases than under the reasonable man standard, the wanton or reckless
standard is more appropriate to further the policy of encouraging rescues

at sea. 7 Although in theory a court should phrase the correct standard as
what a reasonable man under the same circumstances would do, the Fourth
Circuit may have based its wanton or reckless jury instruction on the
notion that juries perceive the wanton or reckless test to be a more relaxed
standard than the reasonable man standard. 79 Thus, more plaintiffs will
be able to recover for injuries that they sustained during rescue attempts
and, therefore, more persons will be likely to attempt maritime rescues. 0
Regardless of whether the Fourth Circuit's wanton or reckless standard
allows recovery in a greater number of situations, substantial precedent
exists for retaining a stricter reasonable man test to apply to the perception
component of the rescue doctrine.8' The rescue doctrine always has required

77. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1987)(Furka
I); Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1088 (4th Cir. 1985)(Furka 1).
The court in Furka I cited several cases in which courts in other jurisdictions applied a
recklessness standard to the conduct of plaintiffs in rescue situations. Furka I, 755 F.2d at
1088 (citing Scott v. John H. Hampshire, Inc., 246 Md. 171, -, 227 A.2d 751, 753 (1967);
Maryland Steel Co. v. Marney, 88 Md. 482, -, 42 A. 60, 66 (1898); Brown v. Nat'l Oil
Co., 233 S.C. 345, -, 105 S.E.2d 81, 87 (1958); see Bell Cab Co. v. Vasquez, 434 S.W.2d
714, 719 (rex. Civ. App. 1968) (Cadena, J., dissenting) (discussing recklessness, as opposed
to reasonableness, as proper instruction to submit to jury for rescue situations). Many courts,
however, have phrased the standard in reasonable man terms. See, e.g., Massey v. Scripter,
401 Mich. 385, 390, 258 N.W.2d 44, 47 (1977) (noting that standard of care for rescuers is
-, 595
one of reasonableness under circumstances); Calvert v. Ourum, 40 Or. App. 511,
P.2d 1264, 1267 (1979) (noting that standard of care is always what reasonable man under
circumstances would do); French v.t Chase, 48 Wash. 2d 825, -, 297 P.2d 235, 238 (1956)
(noting that in conducting rescue, rescuer must act as would reasonable man under circumstances).
78. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1987)(Furka
II). The court in Furka I1 cited Wagner v. International Railway Co. in support of its
conclusion that using two different standards to judge a rescuer's belief and conduct would
be anomalous. Id. at 332. The court in Wagner, however, while emphasizing the intimate
relationship between belief and action in rescue situatigns, presumed that both the rescuer's
belief and the rescuer's action were reasonable in light of the circumstances. Wagner v. Int'l
Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921).
79. See PROSSER & KE TON, supra note 4, § 34, at 209-10 (noting that although many
courts use language in negligence instructions that suggests existence of differing degrees of
care, error is rarely fatal). Some commentators argue that instructions delineating differing
degrees of care confuse the jury and are vague and impractical. Id.
80. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing judicial policy of encouraging
rescues at sea).
81. See, e.g., Stevens v. Baggett, 154 Ga. App. 317, 318, 268 S.E.2d 370, 372-73 (1980)
(noting that rescuer must base his rescue on reasonable belief that rescue is necessary); Holle
v. Lake, 194 Kan. 200, -, 398 P.2d 300, 304 (1965) (same); Elimaker v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 372 S.W.2d 650, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (same); Wolfinger v. Shaw, 138 Neb.
229, -, 292 N.W. 731, 735 (1940) (same); Superior Oil Co. v. Griffin, 357 P.2d 987, 993
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that a rescuer have at least a reasonable belief that someone or something
is in peril.8 2 In one of the earliest cases in which a court applied the rescue
doctrine, Wagner v. International Railway Company,83 the New York
4
Court of Appeals assumed a reasonable belief element of the doctrine.1
In Wagner the plaintiff sustained serious injuries while walking along a
railroad trestle looking for his cousin, who had fallen from a train.85 The
plaintiff sought to recover damages from the railroad company. 6 The
court noted that the railroad owed a duty of due care not only to the

(Okla. 1960) (same); Kelley v. Alexander, 392 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (same);
French v. Chase, 48 Wash. 2d 825,
-, 297 P.2d 235, 239 (1956) (same); Highland v.
Wilsonian Inv. Corp., 171 Wash. 34, 42, 17 P.2d 631, 635 (1932) (same).
The court in Furka II rested its decision not on precedent, but on the difference between
maritime situations and land situations. Furka II, 824 F.2d at 331. The court in Furka II
noted three cases which held that the proper standard for evaluating a rescuer's belief that a
rescue is necessary is the reasonable man standard. Id. For example, in Marks v. Wagner the
Ohio Court of Appeals held that a rescuer must base his actions on a reasonable belief that
a victim is in continued peril. Marks v. Wagner, 52 Ohio App. 2d 320,
-, 370 N.E.2d
480, 484 (1977); see Ellmaker v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 372 S.W.2d 650, 658 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1963) (holding that rescuer must base rescue on reasonable belief that rescue is
necessary); Wolff v. Light, 169 N.W.2d 93, 97 (N.D. 1969) (same). The Furka II court decided,
however, that land rescue cases are inapposite to sea rescue cases. Furka II, 824 F.2d at 332.
Precedent exists, however, for applying different standards of law in admiralty cases then
in common law cases. For example, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines the United States
Supreme Court considered whether a wrongful death cause of action should exist in admiralty.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 386-90 (1970). Prior to Moragne, in The
Harrisburg,another admiralty case, the United States Supreme Court had followed common
law precedent set in Mobile Life Insurance Company v. Brame, in which the United States
Supreme Court held that common law recognized no wrongful death cause of action. The
Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 208 (1886)(overruled by Moragne). See GLMOE & BLACK, supra
note 29, at 359 (discussing the development of wrongful death cause of action at admiralty).
In explaining its decision to recognize a wrongful death cause of action in admiralty, the
Court in Moragne noted that historically, different courts had administered maritime and
common law. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 387. The Moragne Court further noted that because the
maritime courts had a special concern for the welfare of men who undertook hazardous and
unpredictable sea voyages, the separate admiralty courts had developed legal principles that
were foreign to the common law. Id. The Court pointed out that no anomaly existed in
adopting different rules under maritime law and common law, and that because common law
placed greater restrictions on recovery for personal injury and death than did maritime law,
the common-law rule might be incompatible with the law of the sea. Id.; see Grigsby v.
Coastal Marine Serv., 412 F.2d 1011, 1021 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that, because life at sea
presents to individuals who choose it greater risks than life on land, admiralty should be
liberal in matching law to needs of men).
82. See supra notes 11-12, 81 and accompanying text (describing reasonable belief
component of rescue doctrine).
83. 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
84. Wagner v. Int'l. Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 177, 133 N.E. 437, 438. In the language
of the Wagner v. InternationalRailway Company opinion, the New York Court of Appeals
implied that the correct standard of care for the rescue doctrine is the reasonable man standard.
Id. The New York court wrote that "[t]he law cannot say of [the rescuer's] belief that a
reasonable man would have been unable to share it." Id.
85. Id. at 437.
86. Id.
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injured cousin, but also to the plaintiff while he attempted to rescue his
cousin.8 7 The court determined that the plaintiff's belief in the need for a
rescue was reasonable under the circumstances. 88 The plaintiff believed
that he might find his cousin hanging from the bridge and had to make
an instantaneous decision, based on the facts as he perceived them, whether
to undertake a rescue. 89 The court in Wagner decided that the law should
not assess blame to a plaintiff who had acted as a reasonable man in the
same circumstances would have acted. 90 The Wagner court allowed the
plaintiff to recover from the railroad because of the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's belief that a rescue was needed. 91
The reasonableness of a plaintiff's belief that a rescue is needed is
crucial to the just operation of the rescue doctrine. 92 Under the reckless
or wanton standard for perception that the Fourth Circuit adopted in
Furka II, a rescuer may recover from a tortfeasor for injuries that the
rescuer sustained while engaged in a rescue that no reasonable man would
have thought necessary. 93 For example, in Wolff v. Light 4 the defendant

negligently drove his automobile through the plate glass window of a
service station restaurant.9 5 After the car had stopped, the plaintiff reached
into the store window to remove some broken glass and injured his hand
on the glass. 96 In response to the plaintiff's suit for damages, the defendant
claimed that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in reaching into the
broken window. 97 The plaintiff claimed that he had been engaged in a
rescue attempt to protect the patrons of the restaurant from the danger
of falling glass.98 Very few people were in the restaurant, however, and
no one was near the broken window. 99 The court noted that the plaintiff
had no reasonable basis for believing that the patrons in the restaurant
were in imminent peril from the broken glass. 100 Therefore, the court in
Wolff held that the plaintiff could not raise the rescue doctrine as a

87. Id. In Wagner the court explained that a tortfeasor's wrong not only places the
direct victim of the wrong in danger, but also places the victim's potential rescuer in danger.
Id.
88. Id. at 438.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See infra notes 93-107 (discussing importance of reasonableness component of rescue
doctrine to principles of fairness).
93. See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 331-32 (4th Cir.
1987)(Furka II) (adopting wanton or reckless standard of care for perception component of
rescue doctrine at sea).
94. 169 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1969).
95. Wolff v. Light, 169 N.W.2d 93, 96 (N.D. 1969).
96. Id. at 97.
97. Id. at 96-97.
98. Id. at 97.
99. Id. at 96-97.
100. Id.
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defense to the defendant's claim of contributory negligence. 10' Although

the accident in Wolff occurred on land, an analogous situation could
occur at sea. Under the new standard that the Furka I1 court proposed,

the plaintiff in Wolff could argue that although he unreasonably may
have believed that the restaurant patrons were in danger, his belief was

not wanton or reckless.102 Thus, under the wanton or reckless standard,
the plaintiff in Wolff potentially could have recovered damages for his

own negligent conduct. 03 Recovery by the plaintiff in Wolff would have

been contrary to the theoretical basis of the rescue doctrine.? 4 The premise

of the rescue doctrine is that when a defendant is negligent, the defendant
can foresee a rescue attempt.'05 By adopting a wanton or reckless standard
to evaluate the rescuer's belief that a rescue is necessary, the Fourth

Circuit in Furka 11 has determined that even an unreasonable rescue
attempt, like the attempt of the plaintiff in Wolff, is foreseeable to a
06

defendant. 1

In the Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company cases, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has expanded the
scope of the rescue doctrine at sea to allow full recovery from tortfeasors

by rescuers who unreasonably perceive the need for a rescue or unreasonably execute the rescue attempt. 0 7 A rescuer may believe unreasonably

that a rescue is necessary and still recover damages for his injuries,
provided his belief is not wanton or reckless. 0 8 By broadening the scope
of the rescue doctrine, the Fourth Circuit has eliminated entirely the

traditional reasonable man standard from the operation of the rescue

doctrine. 0 9 The Fourth Circuit based the new standard on judicial compassion for the plight of seamen." 0 The standard, however, has no basis

in precedent and ultimately may confuse juries and adversely effect the

101. Id. at 100. In Wolff v. Light the Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that
the plaintiff's own careless, negligent, foolish, reckless, and rash conduct had caused his
injury, and that the plaintiff's failure to exercise due care for his own safety was contributory
negligence as a matter of law. Id.
102. See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1987)
(FurkaI1)(adopting wanton or reckless standard for perception component of rescue doctrine).
103. Id.
104. See J. DooLEy, supra note 5, § 3.10 (noting that foreseeability of injury is basis of
tort liability); see also supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (discussing the rescue doctrine
and its theoretical foundations of foreseeability and chain of causation).
105. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing theoretical basis of rescue
doctrine).
106. See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text (noting that reasonableness is crucial
to just application of rescue doctrine).
107. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 330-31 (4th Cir.
1987)(Furka II); see supra notes 11-13, 78 and accompanying text (discussing traditional
requirement under rescue doctrine that rescuer act reasonably in perceiving need for rescue).
108. Furka 11, 824 F.2d at 332.
109. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's adoption
of wanton or reckless standard for rescue doctrine in Furka II).
110. Furka 1, 755 F.2d at 1089; Furka 11, 824 F.2d at 332.
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ability of maritime corporations to secure liability insurance."' The operation, under the Jones Act, of comparative negligence rather than
contributory negligence, the existence of unseaworthiness as a cause of
action that provides for strict liability of ship owners, and the policy of
awarding monetary rewards for salvage attempts render the Fourth Circuit's concern for would-be rescuers at sea unwarranted.112
K. D. KIRMAYER

111. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (noting tradition of encouraging rescues
at sea); supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting that instructions on rescue and sudden
emergency doctrines often confuse juries); supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (discussing
precedent which dictates that proper standard of care to apply to rescuer's perception of need
for rescue is reasonable man standard, not wanton or reckless standard).
112. See generally GILmoRE & BLACK, supra note 28, at 272-485 (discussing personal injury
actions of seamen, including operation of comparative negligence and strict liability of
unseaworthiness cause of action); M. NoRRis, supra note 15, §§ 233-34 (discussing principle
of salvage awards at admiralty).

